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INTRODUCTION
Today we commemorate the 80th birthday of the State Department's Office
of the Legal Adviser. This event marks both a personal and professional
celebration for so many of us who have been associated with this remarkable
office over the years. The conference has generated a fascinating and diverse set
of comparative, historical, and intragovernmental insights into the office's
unique contributions to the shaping and interpreting of international law. The
last time I addressed an audience from the American Society of International
Law (ASIL), during my first year in this job, I spoke about the role of the Legal
Adviser and some of the current challenges we face.' At this birthday gathering,
let me focus on what has made the Office of the Legal Adviser--or "L," as it is
affectionately known in the State Department-such a critical and respected
part of the U.S. government. Put another way, who are the distinctive people,
and what are the distinctive traditions, norms, and practices, that have made L
the distinctive legal institution it has become?
This event marks a particularly auspicious moment to consider this question,
given the recent publication of a book by Michael Scharf and Paul Williams that
shines welcome light on the history of the office and its unique role at the
intersection of international law and U.S. foreign policy.2 The book offers a
fascinating read and includes interviews with all of the living Legal Advisers,
seven of whom (not counting myself) have joined us at this conference: John
Bellinger, Will Taft, David Andrews, Conrad Harper, Davis Robinson, Roberts
Owen, and Herb Hansell.
At any anniversary party, you review the past, assess the present, and toast
the future. So let me share some reflections on "L Past, L Present, and L
Future."
I. "L PAST": OFFICE CANONS
I am the 22nd American to serve as Legal Adviser at the Department of State,
a list that includes leading figures in the worlds of international law and policy.3
1. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
2. MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRIsis: THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER (2010).
3. For the complete list, see Appendix 1.
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The first Legal Adviser, Green Haywood Hackworth, went on to serve as the
judge of U.S. nationality on the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a position
later held by two other members of our office, former Deputy Legal Advisers
Stephen Schwebel and Joan Donoghue, both of whom are also present here.
That fact alone should tell you that over the years, the Legal Adviser's Office
has been so much more than the Legal Adviser. The heart and soul of the office
has never been the politically appointed lawyers who have served at the
Secretary of State's right hand (a group I will call "Political L"). Rather, the
heart of L has been the dedicated career lawyers who have served as Deputy
Legal Advisers, Assistant Legal Advisers, and Attorney-Advisers, supported by
an extraordinary career staff (a group I will collectively call "Career L"). One
measure of the relative importance of these two sets of positions is that Green
Hackworth, the longest-serving Legal Adviser, served fifteen years under Presi-
dents Hoover, Roosevelt, and Truman, a record no Legal Adviser will likely
ever match. But many career attorneys-including all four of our current
deputies, Principal Deputy Mary McLeod, Jim Thessin, Jonathan Schwartz, and
Sue Biniaz-have served in L for years longer than that.4 And there is a third
face of L, which I will call "Scholarly L," that includes our many alumni who
have gone on to become professors and scholars of international law, as well as
our attorneys who make time to teach on top of their heavy workloads.' At any
given time, the Counselor on International Law, a position currently held by
Professor Sarah Cleveland of Columbia Law School, is the living embodiment
of Scholarly L.6 L is one of the only components of the U.S. government that
has, in the position of the Counselor, a resident scholar in the field who is fully
integrated into the office's work.
My thesis today will be that what has helped make L the renowned institution
it has become is the unique creative synergy among these three faces of the
Legal Adviser's Office-Political L, Career L, and Scholarly L-with Career L
being a particularly dominant force. The interaction among these three lawyerly
groups and instincts has, in turn, generated a rich set of traditions, customs,
expectations, and norms that together ensure L's quality, integrity, and rel-
evance.
With that background, let me quickly tour L's early years before turning to
the current period. To start with a surprise, we have brought you here on
something of a pretext. Strictly speaking, this is not our 80th birthday at all. In
fact, this is our 163rd year! For it was in 1848 that William Hunter, Jr. was
4. Since this speech was delivered, Jim Thessin was sworn in as the U.S. Ambassador to the
Republic of Paraguay. Taking over his Deputy Legal Adviser position is Richard Visek, an L veteran of
more than a decade.
5. For a partial list of L alumni now in teaching, see Appendix 2. For a list of L attorneys who teach
part-time, see Appendix 3.
6. For a list of Counselors on International Law, see Appendix 4. Since this speech was delivered,
Sarah Cleveland has returned to teaching at Columbia, and was succeeded as Counselor by Professor
William Dodge of the UC Hastings College of the Law.
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reportedly first appointed to the position of Claims Clerk to give legal advice to
the State Department. Before then, as we understand it, the early Secretaries of
State-Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, James Madison-did their own inter-
national legal work, which is what one might expect from people so well versed
in the law of nations.7 But by the mid-19th century, what we now call "citizen-to-
state claims"--claims by U.S. citizens against foreign states and vice versa-
had proliferated to the point that they threatened to overwhelm the Secretary
and his small staff. And so in 1848 the position of Claims Clerk was created,
only to be superseded, some twenty years later, by the position of Examiner of
Claims.8 The Examiner of Claims was placed under the Attorney General's
supervision when the Department of Justice was established in 1870,9 and the
Examiner's work soon extended to legal issues ranging far beyond simple
claims, to broader questions of private and public law, citizenship, the laws of
war and the laws of prize, as well as boundary disputes and treaty interpretation.
In 1891, the Examiner of Claims became the Solicitor, still a Department of
Justice employee, and the Solicitor functioned as "the law officer" of the State
Department until 1931.1o But even with the loftier title of Solicitor, giving legal
advice to the State Department was not a full-time job. As proof, one of the
early Solicitors, Fred Nielsen, held the Solicitor's post even while simultane-
ously leading Georgetown's football team to back-to-back conference titles!
Finally, eighty years ago, on February 23, 1931, an Act of Congress-Public
Law 71-715, or the Moses-Linthicum Act, as every schoolchild knows-
abolished the Office of the Solicitor and created today's Office of the Legal
Adviser." The statute pointedly spelled "Adviser" with an "e," in homage to
our ancestral cousin "The Legal Adviser" of the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) of Her Majesty's Government, a position currently held by our
dear friend and colleague Sir Daniel Bethlehem.12 Like his British counterpart,
the American Legal Adviser, supported initially by a staff of twenty or so,' 3 was
intended to provide legal advice on all problems, domestic and international,
that might arise in the course of the Department's activities.
The first Legal Adviser, Green Hackworth, made clear that the Legal Advis-
7. Richard B. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign
Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633, 634 (1962).
8. Robert E. Dalton, The Office of the Legal Adviser 2 (undated) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author). As my footnotes reflect, the history in this section draws heavily on the above-cited
internal paper prepared for another purpose by longtime Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs,
former Counselor, and L legend Bob Dalton, to whom I am indebted for his priceless research and
analysis.
9. Bilder, supra note 7.
10. Dalton, supra note 8.
11. An Act for the Grading and Classification of Clerks in the Foreign Service of the United States
of America, and Providing Compensation Therefor, Pub. L. No. 71-715, § 30, 46 Stat. 1207, 1214
(1931).
12. Since this speech was delivered, Sir Daniel Bethlehem has stepped down as FCO Legal Adviser
and been replaced by Iain Macleod.
13. Dalton, supra note 8, at 3.
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er's Office would not only serve as a general counsel to the Department but
would also act as a government-wide contributor to and defender of interna-
tional law. In his pioneering tenure, Hackworth established important and
enduring foundational traditions of the office. Hackworth was known as (1) an
independent (2) expert on and scholar of international law, publishing a
celebrated series of Digests of International Law in the early 1940s.14 Hack-
worth was also (3) nonpartisan, serving in both Republican and Democratic
administrations; had a (4) wide-ranging remit across the Department's entire
workload;' 5 gave (5) legal advice that was sensitive to the clients' policy
objectives; and took (6) the long view, always seeking to advance the best
long-term interests of the State Department as an institution rather than the
interests of any particular individual or administration. "It is our aim," Hack-
worth wrote, "that the Department of State should be uninfluenced by consider-
ations of momentary expediency or by doctrines that are not calculated to stand
the test of good conscience, fair dealing, and sound principle of law and
practice."' 6 Finally, Hackworth set the basic contours of the position by being
politically savvy without politicizing, that is, by (7) balancing the concerns of
politics and the law. During his tenure, on the one hand, Hackworth clearly and
firmly identified legal constraints and respected stare decisis, while on the other
hand, he remained ready to look for other legally available options if Depart-
ment principals sought to change course.
Thus, in his very person, the founding Legal Adviser combined and captured
the political, career, and scholarly faces of L that I have mentioned. By the time
Hackworth handed over the reins in 1946 to join the ICJ as the American judge,
L's status and significance within the U.S. government had grown tremendously,
a trend only to be fed further by the post-World War II rise of international law
and institutions.
During the Cold War, L's size and role expanded quickly, with Herman
Phleger emerging as another transformational Legal Adviser in the middle of
the 1950s. Phleger knew and worked closely with both Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles and President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Perhaps his greatest victory
was bureaucratic. Phleger resisted the so-called "Wristonization" movement,
which attempted to fold much of the Department's Civil Service, including L,
into the career Foreign Service.' 7 In staving off Wristonization, Phleger reaf-
14. GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (8 vols., 1940-44). By the device of
numbering these office traditions, I seek deliberately to highlight unwritten "Canons of L" that I had
sensed from the outside but had not come to understand fully until I began to serve in the Legal
Adviser's Office.
15. Even today, when we have two Deputy Secretaries of State and dozens of other important policy
principals, the Legal Adviser is perhaps the only official besides the Secretary of State herself with such
a Department-wide remit.
16. Dalton, supra note 8, at 4.
17. Id. at 5. The so-called Wriston Report of 1954 recommended that the State Department integrate
its Civil and Foreign Service Officers. Phleger foresaw that L's independence would be compromised if
the office were absorbed into the Foreign Service; as a result of his successful efforts to stave off this
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firmed another critical L tradition: (8) Its career lawyers would not report
directly to their policy clients, but rather to their managing attorney and the
Legal Adviser. Thus, the office would function like a law firm, not as a
disconnected assortment of lawyers embedded in their client bureaus. The Legal
Adviser, moreover, would report directly to the Secretary-to whom Phleger
demanded a direct line. This arrangement preserved L's identity as (9) an office
of professional international lawyers, not just diplomats who are legally trained,
thereby nurturing the creative tension between Career L and Political L that
continues to this day. The bureaucratic procedures institutionalized during the
postwar period reaffirmed an additional plank of the Legal Adviser's work: that
(10) L must be kept in the loop. As Professors Scharf and Williams explain in
their book, it is now well established within the Department that "virtually no
foreign policy decision can be made without first receiving clearance from L,
and no delegation can be sent to an international negotiation or international
organization without a representative of L."
Under President John F. Kennedy, Legal Adviser and renowned Harvard Law
School Professor Abram Chayes refined that last plank, insisting not only that L
be kept in the loop on important matters but also that its attorneys (11) be "in at
the takeoff" of a new foreign policy episode, in order to help establish the legal
and political legitimacy of the actions that follow. It was only because he was in
at the takeoff that Chayes could, for example, develop the now-famous "defen-
sive quarantine" theory that authorized the use of a naval cordon.to remove the
threat of Soviet missiles in Cuba. As Chayes later recalled in an oral history:
[I]t was very important for both the validity of the [U.S. government]
decision, the subsequent justification, and the mobilization of support that the
legal considerations were taken fully into account during the decision-making
process. Somebody did not just make the decision' and then call the lawyer in
and ask the lawyer to cook up some sort of legal theory to defend it.' 9
Both Chayes and his Deputy and successor, Leonard Meeker, had close access
to their principals. In his personal recollections, Meeker describes how, in
February 1961, he received a direct call from none other than the new President,
John F. Kennedy, who was hugely exercised about a mutiny on a Portuguese
ship. "Kennedy's first reaction was, this is piracy; our Navy should step in." 2 0
fate, L's "professional identity remained that of a lawyer rather than a lawyer-diplomat." Id.; see also
Bilder, supra note 7, at 636 n.7 (explaining that the decision not to integrate L with the Foreign Service
was "important in retaining the Office's status and independence").
18. SCHA"R & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at xix.
19. Living History Interview with Abram Chayes, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNrEMP. PROBS. 459, 480
(1997).
20. Leonard C. Meeker, Recallings (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript at 326) (on file with
author). Meeker explained to the President "that piracy was when others boarded a ship and took it
over . . .. Kennedy rather impatiently found this a technical legal answer. But he did not order the Navy
to seize the ship." Id. at 326-27.
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So you see, I am not the only modem Legal Adviser to have considered piracy
issues.
In the 1960s, Chayes and his deputies Tom Ehrlich and Andreas Lowenfeld
also helped develop another enduring L tradition: (12) L's connection to the
legal academy, which has actively fostered what I have called Scholarly L.
Chayes, Ehrlich, and Lowenfeld all returned to law teaching after their service
in government, and they wrote publicly about the Cuban Missile Crisis as
exemplifying an approach to law they called "International Legal Process."
Their work became the foundation for the so-called "Process School of Intema-
tional Law," of which I have been an academic member.2 1 In 1962, a young
lawyer in L's economic affairs section, future Wisconsin Law Professor Richard
Bilder, wrote an important and enduring article about the Office of the Legal
Adviser in the American Journal of International Law, in which he described L
as serving in nearly all of its current roles: counselor, draftsman, advocate and
negotiator, internal judge, and most of all, international law expert.22
Like many L alumni, Richard Bilder went on to become a distinguished law
professor, thereby exemplifying that L is historically influential not just inside
the government but outside as well, as a training ground for international
lawyers and scholars. 23 To this day, we remain connected to the academy in
ways that enrich the office's ability to determine U.S. views on international
law, similar to the role that the Justice Department's Office of the Solicitor
General and Office of Legal Counsel have played with respect to U.S. constitu-
tional law. That tradition has been reinforced by the scholarly engagement of
Legal Advisers through their writing and lecturing; 24 through their close ties to
learned societies, especially ASIL; through their own advisors, including Coun-
selors on International Law drawn from the academy and Advisory Committees
on Public and Private International Law that have a heavily academic composi-
tion; and through their unique audience, which includes both foreign legal
advisers and international legal academics-not to mention the fact that a
number of Legal Advisers, including myself, have been either part-time or
full-time professors of international law.
The office's reputation for rigorous international legal analysis and scholar-
ship has almost certainly contributed to another important L tradition, exempli-
fied by Leonard Meeker's successor as Legal Adviser, John ("Jack") Stevenson.
During the Vietnam War, in May of 1970, Stevenson gave an important speech
21. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRocEss (2 vols., 1968); see also Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2617-29 (1997)
(describing the evolution of the International Legal Process view).
22. Bilder, supra note 7, at 639-41.
23. See SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 18 ("The Office of the Legal Adviser also serves as a
training ground of sorts for future professors of public international law. L alum, including the Legal
Advisers, have contributed substantially to the body of public international law scholarship, with more
than 1,000 articles and books authored by former L lawyers.").
24. A partial list of publications by Legal Advisers may be found at the back of Scharf and
Williams's volume. Id. at 285-90.
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outlining the Nixon Administration's position on the international legal justifica-
tion for its military operations in Cambodia.2 5 As Stevenson explained,
[iut is important for the Government of the United States to explain the legal
basis for its actions, not merely to pay proper respect to the law, but also
because the precedent created by the use of armed forces in Cambodia by the
United States can be affected significantly by our legal rationale.2 6
From a historical perspective, the most notable aspect of this speech was not
that it was legally correct-in fact, its legal correctness has been significantly
challenged-but rather, the simple fact that the speech was made. By laying out
the Administration's legal theory in a public forum, Stevenson gave American
citizens and legislators, as well as the international community, a fuller opportu-
nity to assess that theory and to test the government's actions in light of it. The
speech reflected and solidified what I will call (13) the Legal Adviser's Duty to
Explain: the important transparency norm that senior U.S. government lawyers,
and the Legal Adviser of the Department of State in particular, are expected not
just to give legal advice in private but also to explain in public the international
legal basis for what the United States has done.2 7 The Duty to Explain is
particularly important in the field of international law, given the central, constitu-
tive role that this body of law assigns to state practice. Chayes, Meeker, and
Stevenson, each in his own way, demonstrated the capacity of U.S. Executive
Branch lawyers not only to interpret but more fundamentally to (14) shape
international law, by interpreting precedents and guiding the creation of new
state practices. That role was reinforced in 1973, when the U.S. Digest of
International Law became an annual publication.
During the Carter Administration, two Legal Advisers affirmed yet another
distinctive feature of the Office: (15) L as action officer. Through his work on
the Middle East peace process at Camp David, Herb Hansell became far more
than a reactive dispenser of advice. He became a negotiator of treaties. His
successor Roberts ("Bob") Owen went further, when during the Iranian Hostage
Crisis, Owen became both a litigator and an architect of a new legal institution.
Owen played the litigator's role when Iran attacked the established international
legal order by holding American diplomats hostage; Owen led the U.S. govern-
ment team that went to the ICJ seeking a declaration of illegality and a request
to restore the status quo ante. Then, in the Algiers Accords that ended the
Hostage Crisis, Owen and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher cre-
ated a refuge of relative peace from the storms of our bilateral relationship, the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, to resolve claims of the two countries and
25. John R. Stevenson, Statement of the Legal Adviser, 64 AM. J. INr'L L. 933 (1970).
26. Id. at 935.
27. As Legal Adviser, I have tried to fulfill this duty in a number of ways, including presentations at
the annual meeting of ASIL and now even blog posts when certain particularly important international
law events occur. See infra note 45.
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those of our nationals through the application of law. Yet another side of L's
work, that of (16) counsel to diplomatic law and litigation, took on new
meaning in the Carter Administration's brief in the landmark human rights case
of Fildrtiga v. Peila-Irala.2 8 Bob Owen, his Deputy Bill Lake, and his Coun-
selor Stefan Riesenfeld worked with Assistant Attorney General for the Civil
Rights Division (and later Yale Law School Professor) Drew S. Days III to
bring human rights sensitivities to the U.S. government's approach to the Alien
Tort Claims Act, a tradition that Clinton Administration Legal Adviser Conrad
Harper carried forward with the brief he and then-Solicitor General Drew Days
filed in the Karadid case.29
During the 1980s, Legal Adviser Davis Robinson continued L's tradition as
litigator by appearing before the ICJ in the Gulf of Maine and Nicaragua cases
and by overseeing the formation of a new L office to deal specifically with
Iranian claims .30 Developments in the latter part of that decade drew an unusual
degree of critical attention to the work of the Legal Adviser. During those years,
a series of controversies arose around such issues as the U.S. military operation
in Grenada, the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the rejection of the ICJ's
compulsory jurisdiction, the assertion of the right to seize fugitives abroad, and
the controversial reinterpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. All
of these challenges led to a probing 1991 report by the Joint Committee of ASIL
and the American Branch of the International Law Association on "The Role of
the Legal Adviser of the Department of State," which noted that "since foreign
policy decisions are often highly political, and policy makers are often skeptical
concerning the relevance of international law, pressures on the Legal Adviser to
'bend' or ignore international law in order to support policy decisions may be
intense."3 It is therefore critical, the report stressed, that the Legal Adviser
recognize and develop tools to carry out "the responsibility of resisting such
pressures.""
Throughout the Clinton years, Legal Advisers Conrad Harper and David
28. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
29. Kadic v. Karadlid, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). The evolution and importance of these two
human rights briefs is described in Harold Hongfu Koh, Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala: Judicial Internalization
into Domestic Law of the Customary International Law Norm Against Torture, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
STORIES 45 (John E. Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson & Mark W. Janis eds., 2007). For the most recent U.S.
government court filing in this line, submitted after this speech was delivered, see Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491
(U.S. Dec. 21, 2011).
30. See Davis R. Robinson, The Reagan Administration, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 55,
55-56, 60-63 (discussing these developments). Ironically, it was through the overwork of the office in
this period that I, as a young Justice Department attorney at the Office of Legal Counsel, had my first
experience with L, when I was detailed to L in 1984 on temporary duty to help fill in for lawyers who
had been dispatched to The Hague to work on these cases.
31. The Role of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State: A Report of the Joint Committee
Established by the American Society of International Law and the American Branch of the Interna-
tional Low Association, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 358, 361 (1991).
32. Id.
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Andrews worked to address these concerns while confronting an ever-larger
suite of legal issues. Perhaps most notably, Harper and Andrews strengthened
the tradition of "L as architect" by assisting in the creation of the International
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda; and they strengthened the
tradition of "L as negotiator" through Andrews' work to resolve the dispute
arising out of the Chinese embassy bombing in Belgrade. Significantly, the
Clinton Administration also called Bob Owen back into service, when then-
Secretary of State Warren Christopher asked Owen to serve as a legal adviser to
Richard Holbrooke at the Dayton Peace Conference in December 1995 and later
as presiding arbitrator at Briko.
For any Legal Adviser, the most intense moments arise when policymakers
desire to use force out of a sense of external urgency. Ed Williamson worked
extensively and productively on use of force and related issues as Legal Adviser
during Operation Desert Storm in the early 1990s. In the difficult years immedi-
ately following 9/11, Will Taft and John Bellinger strove to uphold the rule of
law and to maintain a strong dialogue with their counterpart legal advisers, even
in the face of tremendous controversy about the Bush Administration's legal
views. Legal Advisers can also find themselves in controversy when they seek
to change prior legal positions or resist emerging positions. George H.W. Bush's
Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer became embroiled in public controversy over
his efforts to reinterpret the ABM Treaty,33 while George W. Bush's first Legal
Adviser Will Taft became engaged in a heated interagency dispute when he
attempted to resist and then to roll back the Justice Department's reinterpreta-
tion of the Geneva Conventions after 9/11.34 Some of Taft's valiant efforts on
these sorts of sensitive matters have since come to light.35 Other such efforts by
him, and by every Legal Adviser and by many L attorneys before and after him,
may remain largely hidden from public view.
Thus, to review, L's institutional history has set the core canons of the office,
which may be summarized as follows: Ideally, the Legal Adviser should act as
an independent, nonpartisan expert on and scholar of international law, with a
wide-ranging remit across the Department's entire workload, always giving
33. See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic"
Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1956 (1986).
34. See William H. Taft IV, The Bush (43rd) Administration, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at
127, 129-30.
35. Perhaps the best known example is Will Taft's detailed January 11, 2002 memorandum respond-
ing to the January 9, 2002 memorandum by John Yoo, then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the
Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice. In arguing that Yoo's analysis was "seriously
flawed," Taft wrote: "In previous conflicts, the United States has dealt with tens of thousands of
detainees without repudiating its obligations under the [Geneva] Conventions. I have no doubt we can
do so here, where a relative handful of persons is involved." Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice 1, 2 (Jan. 11, 2002), available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/
documents/200201 11 .pdf. Taft ended on this memorable and poignant note: "Your draft acknowledges
that several of its conclusions are close questions. The attached draft comments will, I expect, show you
that they are actually incorrect as well as incomplete. We should talk." Id. at 2.
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legal advice that is sensitive to the clients' policy objectives, takes the long
view, and seeks to advance the best long-term interests of the State Department
as an institution rather than the interests of any particular individual or adminis-
tration. These competing commitments require the Legal Adviser to balance the
concerns of politics and the law, to report directly to the Secretary (with career
lawyers in turn reporting directly to the Legal Adviser), and to run an office of
professional international lawyers that is kept in the loop with regard to all
departmental matters. L must be in at the takeoff of a new foreign policy
episode to help establish the legal and political legitimacy of the actions that
follow. At the same time, L must also stay connected to the outside world,
including the legal academy, which both reinforces the Legal Adviser's Duty to
Explain and underscores the capacity of U.S. Executive Branch lawyers not just
to interpret but more fundamentally to shape international law. In all of this
work, L plays many roles, not only as a desk-bound interpreter but also as an
action officer, negotiator, litigator, counsel to diplomatic litigation, architect of
new legal institutions, and at times arbiter of international legal disputes.
II. "L PRESENT": OFFICE ROLES
Obviously, this breathless history cannot do our 163 years justice, but one
point at least emerges clearly: As Professors Scharf and Williams explain in
their book, "[j]ust as the Solicitor General is the government's point [person] for
constitutional questions, the Legal Adviser is the government's principal expert
in international legal affairs."3 L continues to be the Executive Branch's
primary agent, authority, and focal point for international law-the institution
charged with figuring out how to formulate and implement the foreign policies
of the United States in accordance with international law and the responsible
development of international institutions. L helps determine how international
agreements should be worded, how international organizations should be struc-
tured, and how customary international law rules should be articulated.
The core traditions of the office have all been evident throughout L's history:
our wide-ranging portfolio, our independence from yet connection to the politi-
cal apparatus, our close ties to the Secretary and her team on the State
Department's Seventh Floor, the institutional predominance and personal dedica-
tion of the career staff, the multilayered mix of the scholarly and the worldly,
and the stunning diversity of roles our lawyers must play. There are some great
government offices in which the lawyers become expert at arguing in a particu-
lar court or giving advice to a particular client. But the lawyers in L must
negotiate the roles of litigator, counselor, action officer, diplomat, arbitrator,
negotiator, scholar, and opinion-giver, all at one time. One way to describe our
role is as "togglers." We toggle constantly among domestic, international, and
foreign legal sources, between public and private law, between our specific
36. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at xix.
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advice-giving duties and our broader normative and strategic responsibilities.
Thinking in functional terms, as I have previously explained, L plays four
basic roles.3 First, L serves as a counselor. Like any public or private general
counsel's office, we give formal and informal legal advice to help our clients
achieve their policy objectives, but in our case the law we apply includes U.S.
constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, judicial decisions, treaty commit-
ments, and customary international law. Second, L serves as a conscience: both
in the sense of an ethical conscience giving prescriptive advice38 and as a group
of individuals who understand how government bureaucracy works and thus
can place issues in a broader normative perspective, especially in the complex,
delicate, and contentious realm of international law, where legal issues may
bleed into moral and policy issues. In this role, it is L's duty and its tradition not
just to try to guide difficult policy choices into lawful channels but also to
suggest when choices may be "lawful but awful." Third, L serves as a defender
of U.S. interests in a variety of contexts. We represent the United States in
treaty negotiations, diplomatic discussions, and international litigation before all
manner of international tribunals, and we coordinate daily with the Department
of Justice on litigation before domestic courts that implicates U.S. foreign
policy interests. Fourth and finally, L acts as a spokesperson for the U.S.
government regarding the meaning and importance of international law. Thus,
speeches like this are, in an important sense, not distractions, but a critical part
of my job as the Legal Adviser.
Another part of my job is to recruit the best and the brightest to come work at
L, and here, the facts largely speak for themselves. Today, the lawyers in
L-spread across twenty-four offices, nineteen functional and five regional-
wear a mindboggling number of hats in many different fascinating and demand-
ing settings. We currently have positions in New York; Charleston, South
Carolina; Briissels; The Hague; Geneva; Kabul; and Baghdad, and at any given
moment some percentage of our lawyers are on temporary duty assignments all
over the world. The attorneys at these locations are not just observers who file
the occasional field report. They are action officers and diplomats who actually
get out there and solve problems, whether it is brokering peace treaties, support-
ing arms export control inspections, or helping American citizens in difficult
circumstances. One reason young lawyers seek temporary duty at these loca-
tions abroad is that they know that, on these postings, they will be responsible
for the entire range of issues confronting their institutional clients. By virtually
any metric, L has become one of the most diverse international "law firms" in
the world. Over the last eighty years, we have experienced tremendous growth,
expanding from fewer than twenty-five employees at our birth to over 175
lawyers and over 260 total personnel in the office today, including many
37. See Koh, supra note 1.
38. Our IJEthics office, for example, advises all political appointees on their ethical duties and
reviews particular issues of potential ethical conflict.
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non-lawyers who are essential to the work we do. At the same time, we have
worked hard to maintain an informal collegial culture, to avoid becoming
rigidly hierarchical, and to maintain a collective spirit of intellectual curiosity
and inquiry.
By way of international comparison, we are significantly larger than virtually
any other country's legal adviser's office.3 We are more of a lawyer's shop, in
that we have much less of a tradition than many of our foreign counterparts of
diplomats (as opposed to lawyers) running the office. Generally speaking, our
Legal Advisers do not go on to become ambassadors. 40 And, not infrequently,
we are lawyers who counsel other lawyers. At this time, for example, L has a
range of brilliant lawyers as clients, including the current President, Secretary of
State, Deputy Secretary of State, National Security Adviser, and Director of the
Department's Policy Planning Staff.
While we have gradually accreted functions over time, so that we now handle
nuclear nonproliferation just as surely as we handle claims disputes, in the
twenty-first century the pace of change has quickened. We must add to the list
whole new fields, such as the law of the Internet, the law of the Arctic, the law
of climate change, and the law of 9/11. As the worlds of international law,
policy, and diplomacy grow ever more complex and interconnected, so does the
work of L. Increasingly, we must address "old wine in new bottles," timeless
concerns in new factual settings. I am thinking, for example, of the problems of
piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the application of international human rights and
humanitarian law to cyberspace, and international legal problems of discrimina-
tion as applied to previously unprotected minority groups. More broadly, over
the course of the history I have recounted, L has developed a substantive
institutional expertise and structural position within the U.S. government that
allows it to be the government's leading authority on a variety of recurring
international legal issues, ranging from diplomatic and consular privileges and
immunities; to the negotiation of international instruments on counterterrorism,
investment, and everything in between; to international environmental law; to
private international law, particularly through the Hague Conference; to specific
statutes and issue areas such as the Iran Sanctions Act and presidential proclama-
tions imposing visa sanctions.
As my listing of roles above suggests, we also fulfill a variety of functions
that are not exclusively legal in nature. L provides stability and continuity over
the course of changing administrations and foreign policy visions, informing
our clients about the broader context in which they operate and bridging
bureaucratic chasms to lay the groundwork for interbureau and interagency
solutions. In addition to counseling clients on what is legal, we may provide
39. See SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 158 (remarks of Conrad Harper).
40. Our career deputies, however, not infrequently do become ambassadors. For example, longtime
Deputy Legal Adviser Jim Michel became Ambassador to Guatemala in 1987, Mike Kozak became
Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba in 1996 and Ambassador to Belarus in 2000, and Jim
Thessin recently became Ambassador to Paraguay.
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them with our assessment of the wisdom of lawful actions they seek to
undertake. The client always remains free to disagree with such an assessment,
but history shows that L's advice is ignored at the policymaker's peril.4' L
attorneys also do significant work outside the confines of the State Department's
walls. We help manage strained relations and chronic tensions with foreign
states in the context of international law-for instance, helping to negotiate
agreements with Cuba to promote safe, legal, and orderly migration. We help
resolve specific international disputes that bubble up. And we help design
international mechanisms for dispute resolution. Increasingly, we are being
asked to operate in conflict and post-conflict zones. All of which makes life at L
endlessly fascinating and highly challenging. I have enjoyed every job I have
had, but I have enjoyed serving as Legal Adviser the most, and nearly every
lawyer who has worked in the office says the same.
III. "L PRESENT": TIMELESS CONCERNS, NEW CONTEXTS
Against this background, let me address in more detail three areas in which
we have had to adapt old expertise to new situations: the law of armed conflict,
the law of official immunities, and the-law of international dispute resolution.
A. LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Cicero famously said that in times of war, the law falls silent. But I prefer the
words of President Obama, who noted in his 2009 Nobel Lecture that even
when a state is engaged in conflict with the most ruthless and lawless of
adversaries, "adhering to standards, international standards, strengthens those
who do, and isolates and weakens those who don't."4 2 Historically, L lawyers
have been passionately committed to this principle, particularly in the Office of
Political-Military Affairs, or "L/PM." And in working every day to uphold it,
these lawyers are conscious that they stand on the shoulders of a group of giants
in the field, all of whom are members of what I have called Career L.
As many of you know, the history of the law of armed conflict in the
post-World War II period is one of peaks and valleys. The Geneva Conventions
41. Davis Robinson provides a vivid example of this point in recalling the mining of the harbors of
Nicaragua during the Reagan Administration, which was undertaken by the CIA without input from the
Legal Adviser's Office:
I would argue strongly that if L had been involved in the take-off in the case of the mining of
the harbors of Managua, we could have provided constructive legal advice .... The input of L
would, I believe, have added a significant dimension to the decision-making process and also
improved the implementation of the President's ultimate decision. However, as it transpired,
instead of being ready for the fire storm that followed the public disclosure of the mining of
the harbors, the Administration was legally caught off-guard. Thus, all that the lawyers could
contribute was assistance in after-the-fact containment of a train wreck.
Robinson, supra note 30, at 60.
42. President Barack H. Obama, Nobel Lecture: A Just and Lasting Peace (Dec. 10, 2009), available
at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture-en.html.
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of 1949 were a towering achievement in the development of humanitarian
safeguards for vulnerable populations. They created for the first time in treaty
law a baseline of protections, reflected in Common Article Three, that states
must afford their enemies even in the context of civil wars and other conflicts of
a non-international character.
Over the next three decades, our engagements in Korea and Vietnam demon-
strated the need for further development of the laws of war. So during the
1970s, there was an initiative to devise protocols to the Geneva Conventions,
elaborating additional rules applicable to international as well as non-
international armed conflicts. Around that same time, many states also initiated
a process-formally launched by the United Nations Conference on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1979 and 1980-to regulate the use of
specific weapons to protect civilians against certain indiscriminate effects.
L attorneys were at the very the center of this work. In 1973, George Aldrich,
now known to many as a longtime arbitrator on the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, was the State Department's Principal Deputy Legal Adviser and one
of the Department's leading experts in the laws of war. He was assigned to head
the U.S. delegation that from 1974 to 1977 negotiated the first and second
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.
The negotiations were not smooth. There were a number of contentious
issues, and the United States did not become a party to Additional Protocol I.
But while serving from 1975 to 1977 as the Special Rapporteur to the Third
Committee of the Diplomatic Conference (an extraordinary position for an
American), Aldrich shared responsibility for drafting and negotiating some of
the most important provisions of both protocols. These included the core rules
that articulate what can be considered legitimate military objectives, when
civilians lose their immunity from being the object of attack, and when attacks
cross the line into indiscriminate or disproportionate conduct. Although the
United States may not agree with every element of all of these rules, it agrees
with a great deal of them, and it is for this reason that when President Reagan
communicated to Congress in 1987 that the United States would not seek to
become a party to Additional Protocol I, he nevertheless committed the United
States to work with allies on incorporating the positive provisions of the
Protocol into the rules that govern our military operations and into the custom-
ary international law that governs international armed conflicts.43
The task of taking forward the President's commitment fell to another lawyer
in L: Mike Matheson, one of our longest-serving Principal Deputies and to this
day a leading figure in the field of international humanitarian law. Like Aldrich,
Matheson had served before joining L at the Department of Defense, where he
developed an expertise in the laws of war, and in due course he rose to a
position in the L Front Office. Working with attorneys from the Defense
43. See Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan to the Senate of the United States (Jan.
29, 1987), reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910, 911-12 (1987).
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Department like Jack McNeill and with JAGs like Hays Parks, Matheson took
on the important project of identifying those elements of Additional Protocol I
that might be supported as customary international law. In 1987, he gave a
landmark speech at American University in which he painstakingly worked
through the elements of Additional Protocol I that the United States might
consider to be customary international law. 4
As mentioned previously, another major initiative in the laws of war during
the post-Vietnam era concerned the development of a regulatory scheme for
certain conventional weapons in the so-called "CCW" forum. Here again,
Matheson is widely acknowledged for his leadership in concluding the Amended
Mines Protocol in 1996. That protocol helped pave the way for further amend-
ment and strengthening of the CCW framework itself, an achievement that owes
a great deal to the late Ed Cummings, Matheson's successor as U.S. head of
delegation to the CCW.
I first met Ed Cummings when I was a young U.S. government lawyer, and it
is hard to identify another person in the law of war community who was as
universally loved and admired for the combination of skill, expertise, and
personal grace that he brought to his work. In addition to shaping efforts to
broaden the scope of the CCW, Cummings was the driving force behind other
signal achievements in the field and a consummate mentor to young lawyers.
His work on Additional Protocol 3 to the Geneva Conventions, for example,
was instrumental in forging a path for the Israeli society, Magen David Adom,
to join the International Red Cross/Red Crescent movement. And he is credited
for his important role in pressing the CCW group toward successful resolution
in the 2005 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War.
L also played a key role in the 1990s in developing the more robust use of
Chapter VII authorities under the United Nations Charter to restore international
peace and stability and to provide the basis for elaborate peacekeeping opera-
tions in East Timor and Kosovo. By the end of that period, I was serving in the
Clinton Administration as Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor under then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
During the Kosovo episode, I admit, I felt uncomfortable about whether L had
fully met its Duty to Explain. It seems to me that particularly when we use
force, we have a duty to explain why we believe that use of force to be lawful.
That is one reason why in various statements and speeches during my tenure, I
have made a special effort to address some of these questions to the extent I can
in a public forum.4 5
44. Michael J. Matheson, Remarks, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. IwT'L
L. & PoL'Y 419 (1987).
45. See, e.g., Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th
Cong. (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh) [hereinafter Koh Libya Testimony], available at
http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/KohTestimony.pdf; Koh, supra note 1; Harold Hongju Koh,
Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya (Mar. 26, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/
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I have spoken of the post-World War II history of the law of war as being one
of peaks and valleys. As many know, the past years have been trying times, and
it was the Legal Adviser's Office that pushed back at numerous critical junc-
tures, including during Will Taft's tenure from 2001 to 2005. Senator Lindsey
Graham memorably remarked in 2005 that "the lawyers in the Secretary of
State's office, while I may disagree with them, and while I may disagree with
Secretary Powell, were advocating the best sense of who we are as people.""6 I
also admired Taft for writing in 2003 that "[w]hile the United States has major
objections to parts of Additional Protocol I, it does regard the provisions of
Article 75 as an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of
an enemy are entitled.""7 The Supreme Court went on to quote Taft's words in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, when it underscored that "[a]lthough the United States
declined to ratify Protocol I, its objections were not to Article 75 thereof.
Indeed, it appears that the Government 'regard[s] the provisions of Article 75 as
an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy are
entitled.' 8 Although in his reminiscences today, Will described himself as
having been embattled in this period, over time, by adhering to principle, L can
sometimes win even when losing.49
When Will Taft left, he was replaced by John Bellinger, who deserves great
credit for opening up channels of communication with our legal counterparts in
allied and partner governments all around the world. Bellinger helped draw the
U.S. government into a posture of engagement on a whole host of sensitive
issues relating to the law of armed conflict, creating bilateral and multilateral
channels for communication that helped rebuild some of the trust that had been
lost in the years following the September 11 attacks. Some of the foreign
government participants in this conference, including Legal Advisers Peter
Taksoe-Jensen of Denmark, Alan Kessel of Canada, and Sir Daniel Bethlehem
of the United Kingdom, played an important role in this effort.
remarks/159201.htm; Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawfulness of the U.S. Operation Against Osama bin
Laden, OpINmo Juis, May 19, 2011, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-of-the-us-operation-
against-osama-bin-laden/; cf Harold Hongju Koh, Statement Regarding Syria (Mar. 30, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/187163.htm.
46. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to Be Attorney General of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 80 (2005) (statement of Sen.
Lindsey Graham).
47. William H. Taft IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE
J. Ir'L L. 319, 322 (2003).
48. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Taft, supra note
47).
49. On March 7, 2011, just a few days after these remarks were delivered, the Obama Administration
announced that the "[tlhe U.S. Government will .. . choose out of a sense of legal obligation to treat the
principles set forth in Article 75 [of Additional Protocol I] as applicable to any individual it detains in
an international armed conflict, and expects all other nations to adhere to these principles as well."
Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantdnamo and Detainee Policy (Mar. 7,
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-actions-guant-namo-and-
detainee-policy. The Administration further urged the Senate "to act as soon as practicable" to provide
its advice and consent to ratification of Additional Protocol II. Id.
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Finally, I cannot complete this review without mentioning my former Princi-
pal Deputy Joan Donoghue, who recently left L to become a judge on the ICJ.
Brilliant, principled, and composed, she was the perfect steward for a delicate
transition from the Bush to the Obama Administrations. During my confirma-
tion process, Judge Donoghue served as Acting Legal Adviser for a protracted
period and spent much of her time guiding senior officials in the new Administra-
tion through the thicket of issues they were inheriting in this area, including by
helping with the implementation of the President's three detention- and interro-
gation-related executive orders of January 2009.
In short, these select L/PM highlights reveal the continuing critical role of
what I have called Career L: career attorneys, supported by the Legal Adviser,
who are deeply committed to America's tradition of abiding by international
humanitarian law. On a day-to-day basis they continue that tradition-always
working closely with our colleagues at the Department of Defense Office of
General Counsel and the Office of the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, with whom we have forged an extraordinary partnership
over decades of collaboration on armed conflict issues. Recently, a team of L
lawyers returned from Geneva, where the U.S. delegation (led by an L attorney)
has been continuing the work of their L predecessors by trying to reach
agreement on a new CCW protocol that would govern cluster munitions;
meanwhile, another team of L lawyers returned from the UN, where they had
been engaged in negotiations regarding the arms trade issue. I myself have
continued to engage with counterpart legal advisers to continue in the intergov-
ernmental dialogue on political-military affairs that John Bellinger helped
establish. The precise subject matter may change over the years, but in this time
of armed conflict, like all others before it, we at L constantly engage in these
sorts of conversations and negotiations to ensure that the law is not silent, but
rather, loudly and proudly incorporated into the practice of modern warfare.
B. OFFICIAL IMMUNITY. FROM THE TATE LETTER TO SAMANTAR
Another area in which L has played a recurring, if changing, role over time
has been in the area of foreign sovereign and official immunity.50 Historically,
the Executive Branch was considered the appropriate branch to determine
immunity, by providing courts with so-called suggestions of immunity. Courts
adopted a two-track process that looked to the State Department to decide
whether immunity was appropriate. If the State Department offered a suggestion
of immunity, the court would dismiss the suit. If the State Department was
silent, the court would decide on its own "'whether all the requisites for such
50. For a fuller description of current State Department practice, see Harold Hongju Koh, Foreign
Official Immunity After Samantar: A United States Government Perspective, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1141 (2011), from which the following discussion directly derives.
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immunity existed,"' 5 1 considering "'whether the ground of immunity is one
which it is the established policy of the [the State Department] to recognize."' 52
The State Department practice of suggestions of immunity evolved over time.
Before 1952, there was absolute sovereign immunity for friendly foreign sover-
eigns. In 1952, Acting Legal Adviser Jack Tate wrote the "Tate Letter" that
adopted a more restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.53 In 1976, Congress
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which codified the
standards for foreign sovereign immunity and transferred primary decision-
making responsibility for determinations of foreign sovereign immunity from
the State Department to the federal courts. The Executive Branch saw the FSIA
as applying only to foreign states, however, not to foreign officials, and there-
fore continued the practice of providing suggestions of foreign official immu-
nity. The circuits were split on this issue. In 2010, the Supreme Court held in
Samantar v. Yousuf that the Executive Branch was correct: The FSIA does not
govern immunity for foreign officials.
In lieu of the FSIA, the Court's Samantar decision makes clear that the
immunity of individual foreign officials derives from common law standards
and from international law. 56 Accordingly, Samantar's own case was remanded
so that the trial court could consider common law immunities potentially
available to him.5 The Supreme Court did not consider the precise nature and
scope of those immunities. Just as they did historically, courts must now look to
the Executive Branch-principally the State Department-to suggest principles
governing official immunity. Before the FSIA was enacted, when the State
Department suggested that a foreign sovereign defendant was immune from
suit, district courts "surrendered [their] jurisdiction" over the case.5 As the
Second Circuit put it, "once the State Department has ruled in a matter of this
nature, the judiciary will not interfere."5 9 The Samantar Court expressly found
"no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to eliminate,
the State Department's role in determinations regarding individual official
51. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284 (2010) (quoting Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587
(1943)).
52. Id. (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945) (alteration in original)).
53. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting
Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T OF STATE BULLETIN 984 (1952).
Forgive me if I note with pride my own fleeting personal connection with Jack Tate. Born in Bolivar,
Tennessee, in 1902, Tate graduated from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville in 1924, and after his
historic service as Acting Legal Adviser moved to my hometown, New Haven, Connecticut, where he
served for many years as the beloved Deputy Dean of Yale Law School. In that role, Tate showed great
kindness to my family, and his wife Elizabeth became my older sister's revered and favorite high
school English teacher.
54. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
55. 130 S. Ct. at 2282, 2292.
56. Id. at 2284-85, 2292-93.
57. Id. at 2292-93.
58. Id. at 2284.
59. Isbrandtsen Tankers v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir. 1971).
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immunity." 6 0 The U.S. government's amicus brief in Samantar explained why a
rigid statutory framework is not appropriate for these determinations; instead
we need flexibility to consider complex issues relying on a nonexhaustive range
of factors.6 '
As a result, building on pre-FSIA practice, we are now establishing a new
process for making these official immunity determinations. We believe that, as
the Court recognized, the State Department, in consultation with others in the
Executive Branch, is best positioned to consider the policy, remedial, substan-
tive, and prudential concerns raised by suits against officials. Four basic reasons
underlie this belief. First, the Department has a unique and critical expertise in
international law and practice; there are nearly 200 lawyers in L whose specialty
is the determination of rules of international law, both positive and customary.
Second, the State Department daily grapples with the impact of litigation on
foreign states. Third, the State Department has expertise regarding the federal
common law of immunity for individual foreign officials and can best distin-
guish true "Samantar" issues from "non-Samantar" procedural issues regarding
status and parties. Fourth, the State Department has a special capacity and
responsibility to evaluate foreign policy and reciprocal consequences of official
immunity decisions. Moreover, the Department is better equipped to do all of
these things today than it was in the era before the FSIA, when it lacked the
resources to make recommendations in certain cases.
In our recent filing before the Eastern District of Virginia, we determined that
Samantar was not immune from suit, based on a number of factors relating to
the facts of the case in conjunction with "the applicable principles of customary
international law." 6 2 We noted, among other things, that the defendant was a
U.S. resident sued by a U.S. citizen, and that he was a former official of a state
with no currently recognized government who would normally enjoy only
residual immunity for acts taken in an official capacity." We also considered
"the overall impact of this matter on the foreign policy of the United States,""
and ultimately determined that Samantar was not immune from suit. The district
court duly followed this determination.
So that is what happens when the Executive Branch makes an official
immunity determination-but what if the State Department stays silent? Will
the State Department really be forced to make an immunity determination in
every single case where that issue might arise? The Supreme Court in Samantar
60. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291.
61. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S.
Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555).
62. Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 7, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04 Civ.
1360 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Samantar Statement of Interest]; see also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 5, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 11-1479 (4th Cir.
Oct. 24, 2011).
63. Samantar Statement of Interest, supra note 62, at 7-9.
64. Id. Ex. 1, at 2.
65. Order, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04 CV 1360 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011).
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explained that under the traditional practice which the FSIA did not displace, if
the Executive Branch chooses not to participate in the litigation, district courts
must consider whether a defendant is entitled to immunity under "the estab-
lished policy of the State Department." 6 6 Once again, the Supreme Court is
looking to the Executive Branch to suggest broader principles of decision to
govern individual immunities of foreign officials. And the more we say now to
set forth an official immunity policy that can guide the courts in these cases, the
less we will have to say in future cases. Thus, just as L works hard to ensure that
during war, the law is never silent, in the area of official immunity, the most
meaningful sound coming from the Executive Branch may ultimately turn out
to be the sound of silence.
C. INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Finally, we should not forget that, as befits an office originally known as the
Examiner of Claims, the resolution of international disputes remains a critical
piece of L's portfolio. At the time of L's founding in 1931, the world had just
passed through its first tentative stages of building the architecture for the
resolution of disputes through the use of international tribunals, and we con-
tinue to participate actively in such efforts before the ICJ, international claims
bodies, and the various international criminal tribunals. Significantly, notwith-
standing the establishment of world courts following the two world wars, this is
a body of law that largely did not even exist at L's 50th birthday.
1. International Court of Justice
All of us are aware that, from early on, the U.S. relationship with interna-
tional dispute resolution has encountered significant rough spots, reflecting in
varying degrees a broader undercurrent within the U.S. body politic of ambiva-
lence toward international institutions generally. Thus, for all the energies
expended by statespersons like Elihu Root dating back at least to the beginning
of the last century, the United States never became party to the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, just as we famously declined to ratify
the Covenant of the League of Nations. And while the United States provided
true luminaries to serve as judges of the Permanent Court-for example, John
Bassett Moore and Manley Hudson, not to mention former Secretaries of State
like Charles Evan Hughes and Frank Kellogg-it is also true that the United
States never participated in litigation before the Court.
After the horrors of World War II, however, the United States did become a
party to the Charter of the United Nations and to the Statute of the ICJ.
Throughout the postwar period, L has led an active U.S. participation before the
ICJ. The United States has participated in more contentious ICJ cases than any
other country, and L lawyers have played a pivotal role in many of the Court's
66. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2284 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
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most significant cases. The same has been true in the Court's advisory cases, in
which the United States has again participated in more cases than any other
country, including the remarkable efforts led by Mike Matheson, the late Jack
McNeill, and others in the Nuclear Weapons cases in the 1990s and, more
recently, the efforts during my own time as Legal Adviser in the Kosovo case in
The Hague.
Although our views do not always prevail, our contributions to these cases
can nevertheless shape international law in profound ways. U.S. participation in
advisory cases reads like a list of some of the most important questions in
international law: Kosovo independence, nuclear weapons, Israel's construction
of a security barrier in occupied territory, expenses of the United Nations, the
Genocide Convention, and the list goes on. I consider myself fortunate to have
represented the United States before the ICJ in the Kosovo case in December
2009. I was deeply moved both to have worked on human rights for Kosovo in
the late 1990s while Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor, and then to be arguing a decade later as the United States' lawyer
urging the international lawfulness of Kosovo's declaration of independence.
U.S. participation in contentious cases has been equally important, with L
representing the United States in disputes regarding consular notification, NATO's
use of force in the Balkans, the inviolability of diplomatic premises and
personnel, oil platforms, the Lockerbie bombing-in all, twenty-two conten-
tious cases to which the United States has been party."
2. International Claims Resolution
At the same time, L has continued its historic role in handling disputes over
property and other economic claims. That role, too, has developed and contin-
ues to expand. For instance, L took the lead in achieving compensation for U.S.
property losses resulting from World War II and the spread of communist
governments in Europe. This was accomplished not through quasi-judicial
commissions of the type that had been used in the 1920s and 1930s, but largely
through bilateral negotiations and lump-sum settlements.
Three decades ago, in 1981, we saw the advent of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal. By providing compensation to many American claimants and
giving the world a weighty and important body of judicial decisions, the
Tribunal has provided a forum for Iran and the United States, acting through
their Legal Advisers, to settle a number of difficult claims. Some of these
settlements have gone beyond the four corners of the Algiers Accords, including
the settlement concerning the tragic shoot-down of the Iran Air passenger plane
67. At this time, we also continue to work vigorously to secure enactment of consular notification
legislation that would implement the United States' obligations under the ICJ's outstanding judgment in
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico. v. United States), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.
31). See, e.g., Fulfilling Our Treaty Obligations and Protecting Americans Abroad: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Patrick Kennedy, Under Sec'y for Mgmt.,
U.S. Dep't of State), available at http://www.state.gov/m/rls/remarks/2011/169182.htm.
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over the Persian Gulf in 1988. Remarkably, the Tribunal has continued to
function to this day as a place where L lawyers and their Iranian counterparts
regularly have bilateral interaction. While the path has not always been
smooth and remains far from perfect, the Tribunal has been the only forum in
which such bilateral interaction has happened for thirty years without significant
interruption. L lawyers were also instrumental in erecting the architecture of the
United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established to compensate
individuals, companies, and states suffering losses from Iraq's 1990 unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Virtually without fanfare, over 1.5 million
claimants have been compensated nearly $30 billion dollars by the UNCC.
Arbitration has taken firm hold in another area: international investment.
Here too, L has played a significant role in shaping the way that the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tribunals consider key international
legal issues. The entry into force of NAFTA in 1994 ushered in for the United
States, Canada, and Mexico a period of unprecedented growth in the resort to
binding international arbitration to resolve investment claims under the Agree-
ment's Chapter 11. L has led the defense of more than a dozen challenges to
U.S. laws, and I had the privilege of arguing the Grand River case, in which the
United States recently prevailed. 9 These tribunals render important decisions
both for our investors venturing abroad with their capital and for law- and
policymakers around the world who have agreed to a set of enforceable rules in
NAFTA and in our broader suite of bilateral investment and free trade agree-
ments.
3. Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals
When war raged in the Balkans in the early 1990s, L stood at the forefront of
negotiations to establish the first international criminal tribunal since the Nurem-
burg trials. Created through a binding resolution adopted by the UN Security
Council, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
has served as a haven of justice for some of the worst atrocities perpetrated in
the region, and its work continues to this day. L lawyers have been deeply
involved in shaping every step of the process, from playing a lead role in
drafting the founding statute for the ICTY, to managing U.S. cooperation with
the Tribunal through our team at the Embassy in The Hague, to negotiating the
terms of a resolution for an orderly transition to a successor institution that will
handle so-called "residual issues" for both the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals,
seeking to ensure that any fugitives remaining cannot escape justice simply by
outrunning the clock.
Over the course of nearly twenty years, the ICTY has indicted some 161
68. As this article goes to press, a group of L attorneys, including myself, are preparing to present
the U.S. case to the Tribunal in Case No. A(15)(IV).
69. Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States, Award (ICSID Jan. 12, 2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156820.pdf.
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individuals and concluded proceedings for 125 accused, in the process creating
a wealth of jurisprudence that elaborates and explains applicable international
law on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The ICTY has also
served as a model for a number of other "ad hoc" and "hybrid" international
criminal tribunals that have been created to address cries for justice in Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Lebanon. Together, these tribunals have not only
served as an endless source of novel and challenging legal issues for L to
grapple with, but they have also proven to be an excellent training ground for
new L attorneys, many of whom come to us after spending time as interns or
employees at the tribunals engaged in the practice of international criminal law.
The success of these tribunals has strengthened and entrenched the basic
principle-for which support is now virtually universal-that perpetrators of
gross atrocities must be held to account.
4. International Criminal Court
Although we sometimes forget, the United States was also an early supporter
of an international criminal court. It will not surprise that this, too, has been a
bumpy ride-with the United States first declining to sign the Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) at the conclusion of negotiations in Rome in
1998, subsequently deciding to sign on the last possible day during the final
month of the Clinton Administration, and then in 2002 submitting a letter in
which Under Secretary John Bolton purported to "un-sign" the Statute. Our
rocky relationship with the ICC reflects a deep national tension between on the
one hand, the longstanding bipartisan support for accountability in the face of
atrocities, and on the other, a fear of international institutions that might sit in
judgment of the United States, particularly in the form of criminal prosecutions
against young Americans who serve in our Armed Forces.
While the exact path forward may not yet be known, it is clear that we have
finally been able to swing the pendulum away from unsustainable U.S. positions
of the past decade. That movement began at least as far back as the decision of
the United States in the spring of 2005 to allow the UN Security Council to
refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC, a decision that was followed by
commendably steadfast efforts in the final years of the Bush Administration to
oppose those who would interfere with the Court's work there. In the fall of
2009, the Obama Administration reengaged with the Assembly of States Parties,
and in the summer of 2010, I co-headed a large observer delegation to the ICC
Review Conference in Kampala. Thus, with little fanfare, in just three years we
have shifted the default of our relationship with the ICC from hostility to
positive engagement.o In a sign of how far we have come, the Security Council
70. See generally The U.S. and the International Criminal Court: Report from the Kampala Review
Conference (June 16, 2010) (remarks of Harold Hongju Koh and Stephen J. Rapp), available at
http://www.asil.org/filesffranscriptICC-KohRappBellinger.pdf. As an academic, I had discussed
some of the challenges of addressing the United States' relationship with the ICC and other interna-
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recently made a historic, unanimous referral of the Libyan situation to the ICC.
The United States proudly, and without controversy, cast its first vote in favor of
an ICC referral. The ICC's Prosecutor announced that he will open an investiga-
tion into those who are most responsible for the most serious crimes committed
in Libya, and stressed that there will be no impunity.
As the ad hoc tribunals move to complete their work, it is to the ICC that
eyes around the world will increasingly turn to provide accountability and
legality in the face of unspeakable atrocities. And while there were and remain
considerable questions about the Court and the Rome Statute, we have sup-
ported the Court's ongoing prosecutions; we now participate actively and
constructively in the meetings of the Assembly of States Parties, as we did also
in the Review Conference held last summer in Kampala; and we meet regularly
with the Prosecutor to determine the kinds of tangible assistance needed to
bring successful prosecutions. Within the framework of domestic legal and
political constraints, L has thus helped the United States make significant
headway in building a more productive and sustainable relationship with the
ICC that will serve the interests of the United States as well as the cause of
international criminal justice.
IV. "L FUTURE": NEW CHALLENGES, ENDURING PRINCIPLES
What this review of past and present should make clear is that the more L has
changed, the more its basic roles have stayed the same. As Mike Matheson has
succinctly summarized, the Legal Adviser "gives legal advice before decisions
are made; he gives the best possible legal defense for the decision once it has
been made; he contributes to solving practical problems with his lawyering
skills; and he needs to be able to use the personnel available to accomplish these
objectives."
Even still, to stay the same, L will have to change. New factual challenges
will constantly arise, and those challenges will force us to adapt our legal
paradigms to new scenarios-at times providing old wine in new bottles, at
other times providing an entirely new legal analysis to meet rapid technological
change. Issues that could be described as old wine in new bottles have recently
included such well-worn topics as piracy, immunity of foreign officials, and
international dispute resolution, which increasingly raises not just questions about
adjudicatory fora but also complex issues of compliance and implementation.
Most significantly, this recent period has also witnessed the emergence of
technologies-digital, biological, chemical, genetic-that may require more
profound adaptations by L. The Internet alone has generated major new debates
about the nature of human freedom and expression, cyber war, cybersecurity,
online privacy, and much else Hugo Grotius could never have imagined. When I
tional tribunals in Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479, 1503-09
(2003).
71. ScHARF & WILLIAMs, supra note 2, at 156-57 (remarks of Michael J. Matheson).
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became Legal Adviser, I said we would concentrate on the law of globalization,
an area that will increasingly grip our attention as we live in an age not divided
by a Berlin Wall but linked by a World Wide Web. The defining players will not
be blocs of countries, necessarily; they may be networks of actors connected in
countless tangible and intangible ways that challenge our traditional understand-
ings of international relations and international law.
Increasingly, we find ourselves addressing twenty-first-century challenges
with twentieth-century laws. It is no secret that our polarized political environ-
ment has made it increasingly difficult to ratify treaties or to enact legislation.
But rather than simply dismissing the extant law as quaint and outmoded, we
find ourselves increasingly trying to translate the directive and spirit of these
laws to unanticipated situations. On a daily basis, we seek to answer questions
never contemplated by the framers of legal instruments, questions like: How
should the War Powers Resolution apply to a limited, NATO-led, UN-
authorized operation that implicates the international community's responsibil-
ity to protect innocent civilians? 72 How do the Geneva Conventions apply to an
armed conflict with a transnational non-state terrorist organization like Al
Qaeda, or to the efforts of a computer programmer to attack a government
system by changing the number zero to the letter o?"3 What will the conse-
quences be if global warming leads the Arctic ice cap to shrink and the United
States cannot bring about a workable global climate change convention or
accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea?74 How does the FSIA's
language regarding "foreign states" apply to the emerging institutions of the
European Union?75 Does the FSIA permit execution of judgments against China
upon giant pandas or their embryos?76
And in negotiating these myriad new challenges, how will we know if we are
succeeding? By what metric can we judge our influence in advancing U.S.
interests while promoting respect for, and compliance with, international law? I
have no complete answer to this question. But surely, we cannot fairly measure
L's influence by such crude metrics as counting how many treaties have been
ratified or cases won. We cannot fall prey to the trap that when you cannot
measure what is important, you make important that which you can measure.
One short measure of our worth is that we are only as good as our principals,
72. See Koh Libya Testimony, supra note 45.
73. For a partial answer, see Koh, supra note 1.
74. Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratification of the 1994 Agreement
Amending Part XI of the Lw of the Sea Convention: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 112th Cong. (2012) (written testimony of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State), available at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/REVISED_Secretary_Clinton
Testimony.pdf.
75. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, European
Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 11-2475 (2d Cir. Oct. 4, 2011).
76. See Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 2011)




and we are only as good as our principles. We are only as good as the principals
for whom we serve as agents: President Barack Obama, Secretary Hillary
Clinton, and the many other clients for whom we work. And we are only as
good as our principles: the values that we live by and that we seek to uphold
every day. On these qualitative dimensions, I am confident that L will continue
to thrive.
More generally, I retain the utmost confidence in L's ability to meet new
challenges because of three of the office's core, established strengths, already
alluded to earlier. The first is L's unique perspective: its ability to place issues in
broader geographic, historic, and legal context. This ability is nurtured by our
system of attorney rotation, which keeps lawyers in L for long tenures while
allowing them to work on an ever-expanding set of issues, thus avoiding
intellectual calcification while maintaining institutional continuity and knowl-
edge. It is nurtured by the structure of the State Department, which is effectively
a microcosm of the U.S. government in the way it must balance all U.S. foreign
policy interests-from trade to counterterrorism to tourism to human rights-
and which is uniquely plugged in to foreign governments and events, interna-
tional bodies, and emerging global trends and norms. It is nurtured by L's role
as the U.S. government's primary interface with the international legal commu-
nity, which allows our attorneys to bring other countries' views and experiences
back to our interagency colleagues, and to share our views and experiences with
allies. It is nurtured by L's role in helping to set the U.S. government's
international law agenda and to coordinate its position on international law
questions, which keeps us on the cutting edge of novel legal issues. And it is
nurtured by L's reputation as a repository of information and insight on U.S.
foreign policy, which gives us an unparalleled background in the legal prec-
edents of diplomacy, crisis management, and the like.
Second, I take confidence in the strength and significance of L's unique
relationships. This conference, and the participation of eminent foreign col-
leagues, has helped to showcase why the office will perpetually benefit from the
multilateralism that is woven into the fabric of our daily work. What L
understands, as Sir Daniel Bethlehem likes to say, is that you may not be able to
herd cats, but you can move their food. And so we work daily with foreign
colleagues to change incentives and restructure situations. Beyond our relation-
ships with foreign colleagues, we are engaged in multiple other dialogues,
mirroring the subjects of the panels today: our interagency conversations about
international law with colleagues across the U.S. government; our conversations
with groups such as ASIL and with the legal academy; and our conversations
with ourselves, through our repeated examination of the office's precedents and
practices. Only by maintaining such close ties with colleagues inside and
outside the United States and inside and outside government, and by maintain-
ing respect for and continuity with our predecessors, can L strike its trademark
balance of independence, expertise, and creativity in solving problems and
promoting the rule of law.
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Third, and most important, I draw confidence from L's unique dynamism. The
"ism" that best characterizes the lawyers in our office is neither conservativism
nor liberalism, but "metabolism." We are a notably energetic bunch. We are not
potted plants. Our job is to identify legal channels within which policy decisions
can flow and to shape legal instruments through which policy goals can be
pursued. That task can seem monumental, and the work ceaseless. But we
engage daily in a remarkable exercise, an interactive process between lawyers
and policymakers through which legal doctrine moves from abstraction to
reality. Law influences policy, policy makes law, and that perpetual feedback
loop is a key to understanding why lawyering in L has historically been such a
dynamic enterprise and to determining why nations obey international law. In
my academic work, I have observed and described this phenomenon, which I
have called "transnational legal process." 7 For the past few years, I have been
lucky enough to live within this process at L and, from that vantage point, to
help shape it.
CONCLUSION
Across 163 years (eighty as a statutory entity), L's decades have been full of
lessons learned in the crucible. Those experiences cast important light on what
it means to be government lawyers committed to the rule of law in international
affairs. For if international relations are to be more than just power politics, true
international lawyers must fuse their training and skill with moral fortitude and
guide the evolution of legal process with the application of reasoned and
respect-worthy legal norms. Our foreign policy decisions most fully conform
with international law when the international lawyers are at the table while
important decisions are being made. By having the courage to argue with our
clients; to invoke illegality when appropriate; to offer creative legal solutions,
fearless advice, and loyal implementation; and to defend our country when
challenged, we serve the highest values of our office. While much else may
change, my time inside L has given me deep faith that future L attorneys will
continue to uphold these proud traditions over the next eight decades and
beyond.
77. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law
Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L.
REv. 181 (1996).
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APPENDIX 1: LEGAL ADVISERS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Legal Adviser Year Began Year Ended Nominating President
Green H. Hackworth 1931 1946 Herbert Hoover
Charles H. Fahy 1946 1947 Harry S. Truman
Ernest A. Gross 1947 1949 Harry S. Truman
Adrian S. Fisher 1949 1953 Harry S. Truman
Herman Phleger 1953 1957 Dwight D. Eisenhower
Loftus Becker 1957 1959 Dwight D. Eisenhower
Eric H. Hager 1959 1961 Dwight D. Eisenhower
Abram Chayes 1961 1964 John F. Kennedy
Leonard C. Meeker 1965 1969 Lyndon B. Johnson
John R. Stevenson 1969 1973 Richard Nixon
Carlyle E. Maw 1973 1974 Richard Nixon
Monroe Leigh 1975 1977 Gerald Ford.
Herbert J. Hansell 1977 1979 Jimmy Carter
Roberts Bishop Owen 1979 1981 Jimmy Carter
Davis R. Robinson 1981 1985 Ronald Reagan
Abraham D. Sofaer 1985 1990 Ronald Reagan
Edwin D. Williamson 1990 1993 George H. W. Bush
Conrad K. Harper 1993 1996 William J. Clinton
David Andrews 1997 2000 William J. Clinton
William Howard Taft IV 2001 2005 George W. Bush
John B. Bellinger III 2005 2009 George W. Bush
Harold Hongju Koh 2009 present Barack Obama
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APPENDIx 2: PARrIAL LIST OF L ALUMNI CURRENTLY IN TEACHING
Name Title Institution
Jos6 Enrique Alvarez Herbert and Rose Rubin New York University
Professor of International School of Law
Law
Ronald J. Bettauer Visiting Scholar George Washington University
School of Law
Richard B. Bilder Foley & Lardner-Bascom University of Wisconsin Law
Emeritus Professor of School
Law
Andrea K. Bjorklund Professor of Law UC Davis School of Law
Christopher Blakesley Cobeaga Law Firm William S. Boyd School of Law
Professor of Law (University of Nevada, Las Vegas)
Daniel M. Bodansky Lincoln Professor of Sandra Day O'Connor
Law, Ethics, and College of Law
Sustainability (Arizona State University)
Steven Burton John F. Murray Professor University of Iowa College of
of Law Law
N. Jansen Calamita Lecturer in International Birmingham Law School (UK)
Law
Christine Cervenak Program Director and University of Notre Dame
Concurrent Assistant Law School
Professor
Jacob Katz Cogan Associate Professor of University of Cincinnati
Law College of Law
John R. Crook Professorial Lecturer in George Washington University
Law School of Law
Lori Fisler Damrosch Hamilton Fish Professor Columbia Law School
of International Law and
Diplomacy and Henry L.
Moses Professor of Law
and International
Organization
Kristina Daugirdas Assistant Professor of University of Michigan Law
Law School
Ashley Deeks Associate Professor of University of Virginia School
Law of Law
Mark Feldman Assistant Professor of Peking University School of
Law Transnational Law
David A. Gantz Samuel M. Fegtly James E. Rogers College of
Professor of Law Law (University of Arizona)
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Name Title Institution
Monica Hakimi Assistant Professor of University of Michigan Law
Law School
Duncan Hollis Associate Professor of Beasley School of Law (Temple
Law University)
David Kaye Executive Director, UCLA School of Law
International Human
Rights Law Program
Orde F. Kittrie Professor of Law Sandra Day O'Connor College
of Law (Arizona State
University)
John H. Knox Professor of Law Wake Forest School of Law
Hans A. Linde Distinguished Scholar in Willamette University College
Residence of Law
Andreas F. Lowenfeld Herbert and Rose Rubin New York University School of
Professor of International Law
Law Emeritus
Michael Matheson Professorial Lecturer in George Washington University
Law School of Law
Timothy L. Meyer Assistant Professor of University of Georgia School of
Law Law
Saira Mohamed Assistant Professor of UC Berkeley School of Law
Law
John F. Murphy Professor of Law Villanova University School of
Law
Sean D. Murphy Patricia Roberts Harris George Washington University
Research Professor of School of Law
Law
Diana Helweg Senior Research Fellow John G. Tower Center for Political
Newton Studies, Dedman College
(Southern Methodist University)
Bernard H. Oxman Richard A. Hausler University of Miami School of
Professor of Law Law
Vijay Padmanabhan Assistant Professor of Vanderbilt Law School
Law
Jason Palmer Associate Professor of Stetson University College of
Legal Skills Law
Elizabeth Rindskopf Dean and Professor of University of the Pacific,
Parker Law McGeorge School of Law
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Name Title Institution
Antonio Perez Professor of Law Columbus School of Law
(Catholic University of
America)
David Pozen Associate Professor of Columbia Law School
Law
Steven R. Ratner Bruno Simma Collegiate University of Michigan Law
Professor of Law School
Sally Rider Director, William H. James E. Rogers College of
Rehnquist Center Law (University of Arizona)
Sabrina Safrin Professor of Law Rutgers School of Law
Pammela Quinn Visiting Assistant Earle Mack School of Law
Saunders Professor of Law (Drexel University)
Michael P. Scharf John Deaver Drinko-Baker Case Western Reserve
& Hosftetler Professor of University School of Law
Law
Dustin N. Sharp Assistant Professor Joan B. Kroc School of Peace
Studies (University of San
Diego)
Anna Spain Associate Professor of University of Colorado Law
Law School
Peter J. Spiro Charles R. Weiner Beasley School of Law (Temple
Professor of Law University)
David P. Stewart Visiting Professor of Law Georgetown University Law
Center
Jane E. Stromseth Professor of Law Georgetown University Law
Center
Kenneth J. Vandevelde Professor of Law Thomas Jefferson School of Law
Geoffrey R. Watson Professor of Law Columbus School of Law
(Catholic University of
America)
Allen S. Weiner Senior Lecturer in Law Stanford Law School
Paul R. Williams Rebecca I. Grazier Washington College of Law
Professor of Law and (American University)
International Relations
David A. Wirth Professor of Law Boston College Law School
Diane P. Wood Senior Lecturer in Law University of Chicago Law
and Federal Judge School and U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Michael K. Young University President University of Washington
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APPENDIx 3: LIST OF L ArrORNEYS CURRENTLY IN TEACHING
Name Title Institution
Elizabeth R. Amory Adjunct Professor Johns Hopkins Graduate School of
Advanced International Studies
Evelyn M. Aswad Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Alexis R. Blane Adjunct Professor of Law Washington College of Law
(American University)
Gilda Brancato Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Lee M. Caplan Adjunct Professor of Law Washington College of Law
(American University)
Robert E. Dalton Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Steven F. Fabry Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Katherine M. Gorove Adjunct Professor of Law Washington College of Law
(American University)
James A. Gresser Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Brian R. Israel Adjunct Professor of Law George Mason University School
of Law
Darin E. Johnson Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Theodore P. Kill Adjunct Professor of Law George Mason University School
of Law
Karin L. Kizer Adjunct Professor of Law Washington College of Law
(American University)
Kathleen M. Milton Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Patrick W. Pearsall Adjunct Professor of Law George Washington University
School of Law
Virginia P. Prugh Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Max L. Rettig Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Christina Sanford Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Jeremy Sharpe Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Neha Sheth Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Jennifer I. Toole Adjunct Professor of Law Washington College of Law
(American University)
Richard C. Visek Adjunct Professor of Law Georgetown University Law Center
Jeremy M. Weinberg Adjunct Professor of Law George Mason University School
of Law
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APPENDIX 4: COUNSELORS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
Years of
Name Service Current Position
Marjorie Millace 1965-1970 Deceased
Whiteman
Louis B. Sohn 1970-1971 Deceased (formerly Bemis Professor of
International Law, Harvard Law School)
Richard R. Baxter 1971-1972 Deceased (formerly Professor of
International Law, Harvard Law School)
John Norton Moore 1972-1973 Walter L. Brown Professor of Law,
University of Virginia School of Law
Stephen M. Schwebel 1973-1974 International Arbitrator; President of the
Administrative Tribunal of the World Bank
Gordon B. Baldwin 1975-1976 Deceased (formerly Evjue-Bascom
Professor Emeritus of Law,
University of Wisconsin Law School)
Detlev F. Vagts 1976-1977 Bemis Professor of International Law,
Emeritus, Harvard Law School
Stefan A. Riesenfeld 1977-1980; Deceased (formerly Professor of Law, UC
1981-1982 Berkeley School of Law and UC Hastings
College of the Law)
Gerald Rosberg 1980-1981 Senior Vice President, The Washington
Post Company
Fred L. Morrison 1982-1983 Popham, Haik, Schnobrich/Lindquist &
Vennum Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School
Harold G. Maier 1983-1984 David Daniels Allen Professor of Law
Emeritus, Vanderbilt Law School
Stephen C. McCaffrey 1984-1985 Distinguished Professor and Scholar,
University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law
Malvina Halberstam 1985-1986 Professor of Law, Yeshiva University,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Robert E. Dalton 1988-1991 Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center; Senior Advisor on
Treaty Practice, U.S. Department of State
Philip C. Bobbitt 1991-1993 Herbert Wechsler Professor of Federal
Jurisprudence, Columbia Law School
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Years of
Name Service Current Position
Theodor Meron 2000-2001 Appeals Judge and President, International
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia;
Charles L. Denison Professor of Law
Emeritus and Judicial Fellow, NYU Law
School
Nancy Ely-Raphel 2003 Retired (formerly U.S. Ambassador to
Slovenia)
Curtis A. Bradley 2004 Richard A. Horvitz Professor of Law, Duke
University School of Law
Edward T. Swaine 2005-2006 Professor of Law, George Washington
University Law School
Paul B. Stephan 2006-2007 John C. Jeffries, Jr. Distinguished
Professor of Law, University of Virginia
School of Law
John C. Harrison 2008 James Madison Distinguished Professor of
Law, University of Virginia School of Law
Lewis Yelin 2009 Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division,
Department of Justice
Sarah H. Cleveland 2009-2011 Louis Henkin Professor of Human and
Constitutional Rights, Columbia Law
School
William S. Dodge 2011-2012 Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of
the Law
17812012]1

